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*Sourced*South Africa: Time Running Out, RevisitedSummary

Events in South Africa have unfolded rapidly in the five years since the publication of South Africa: Time Running Out. Nevertheless, we believe that, in general, the conclusions reached by the Rockefeller Foundation Study Commission on US Policy toward Southern Africa are still valid. Furthermore, we believe that with a few exceptions and qualifications, the themes in the chapters on specific elements of the South African scene are still valid. The Commission identified currents in South African society that have continued to flow through the period since 1981. [redacted]

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
Major new developments have occurred, however. A new constitution providing for Colored and Indian representation at the national level was implemented, and P. W. Botha was elected State President by a multiracial (white, Colored, and Indian) electoral college. South Africa also saw the emergence of another right-wing white political party (the Conservative Party), a 500,000 member black African labor federation (COSATU), and a multiracial antiapartheid group claiming two million members (the United Democratic Front). The prophetic statement in the foreword of the book that "South Africa is an issue destined to come to the fore in the 1980s" , was fulfilled, not because of these peaceful

This typescript memo was prepared for the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa by [redacted] the Office of African and Latin American Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and should be addressed to the Chief, Africa Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis, [redacted]

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protest and repression--with over 1000 deaths and 7,000 persons detained--that has captured world attention over the last sixteen months. We agree that time for a peaceful solution in South Africa continues to run out. []

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This typescript memorandum does not address the conclusions of the commission concerning US policy toward South Africa or South Africa's relations with other countries. []

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The Commission's Findings: Comments

"Whatever the South African government does to reinforce the status quo, black forces inside the country will eventually alter it." -- This, as the commission itself defines it, is its central judgment. The opposite view would argue that the status quo, i.e., white control and apartheid, will endure. We agree with the commission that the end of white domination is the more probable outcome, but note that the timing of such an eventuality is no more clear now than it was in 1981. We believe that events in South Africa will be erratic and volatile, but that as the crisis continues, the chances will increase that one event or a series of seemingly unrelated events could start a process that culminates in fundamental political change. On the other hand, a white-dominated South Africa could muddle along for an extended period. []

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"The final battle lines have not yet been drawn in South Africa." -- Despite the recent escalation in physical and rhetorical confrontation between the government and nonwhite activists, we have concluded, as the commission did in 1981, that the country still has not reached that "climatic turning point" beyond which dialogue is impossible. The principle of a negotiated future is accepted by all but the most extreme leaders on the right and left, and discussions between opposing groups have occurred even during the height of the unrest in late 1985.

- Delegations of South African businessmen and white opposition members of Parliament held talks with the ANC in Lusaka.
- A Soweto parents committee held discussions with the Department of Education aimed at solving the school boycott.
- Community groups in Mamelodi negotiated with police to ease funeral restrictions for the burial of 13 victims of unrest.
- Black leaders cancelled a consumer boycott in the Port Elizabeth area after their demands were met by the government through the intercession of local businesses. []

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Nonetheless, the stringent conditions which both government and antigovernment groups have attached to formal negotiations over such issues as powersharing have created an impasse. For example, Chief Gatscha Buthelezi, a moderate black and an

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[redacted]

advocate of negotiations with Pretoria, has refused publicly to hold talks with the government on powersharing until all black leaders--including Nelson Mandela--are released from prison. According to press and US Embassy reporting, most blacks fear being labeled as collaborators and are subject to mob attack if they talk with the government. Cabinet officials have stated publicly that they have had private discussions with unidentified black leaders. According to press and US Embassy reporting, most credible black spokesmen are either in prison or banned from political activities, however, so public debate among blacks on the negotiations issue is stifled. There is a danger that increased violence--particularly that targeted against whites--may destroy what goodwill exists on both sides, along with the possibilities for negotiations. We agree that time is running out. [redacted]

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"For blacks and whites, certain positions are nonnegotiable." -- We concur with the commission's belief that blacks will not participate in negotiations unless the issue is genuine powersharing, and whites will not consider a winner-take-all form of majority rule. While these two positions would seemingly leave ample ground for an accommodation, both sides also have immediate political concerns that, at least for the present, add on more nonnegotiables. For example, President Botha has stated publicly that any reforms must preserve segregated neighborhoods and schools for whites. [redacted]

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"Many white leaders appear to accept the need to undertake some real reforms, and many black leaders appear to accept that fundamental changes will not come quickly and that compromises will have to be made. Younger blacks, however, are growing more radical and impatient." -- We believe that the gap between black expectations and what the government is willing to concede is growing. Furthermore, black and white leaders--whatever they may believe in private--have been timid, either unwilling to take the bold step or unable to envision effective action. President Botha complains publicly [redacted] that he is a reformer who has made courageous decisions that go unappreciated, particularly by Western governments. We believe, however, that Botha takes seriously the threat of rightwing revolt and is mindful first of his--and his party's--political risks. A review of public statements shows that white leaders who publicly urge faster reform are part of the official opposition or outside the government. [redacted]

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Black leaders, meanwhile, have become more radical. Those publicly favoring compromise risk losing their followings, in our view. We have noted, for example, the growing militancy of such moderates as Bishop Tutu. The competition among various antiapartheid groups for members may be partly responsible, in our view, with each organization trying to sound more militant than the others. Most knowledgeable sources agree that younger blacks are noticeably more radical and impatient. Many young activists expect black majority rule within a few years, according to US Embassy reporting. [redacted]

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"Whites are not ready to accept blacks as equals or to share power with them...And blacks do not yet possess sufficient leverage to compel whites to share power."

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-- Certainly it is true that most whites are not ready to accept blacks as equals or to accept majority rule, but attitudes on powersharing may be changing. A survey conducted in October 1985 indicated that two-thirds of the whites polled viewed powersharing with blacks as "inevitable," and a clear majority interpreted this to mean mixed-race government at all levels. Blacks have not yet tested their leverage, in our view. Representing 70 percent of the workforce and 40 percent of consumer buying power, they may, in our judgment, have considerable leverage if they were to overcome the significant barriers to concerted action. [REDACTED]

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The following judgments of the commission made in 1981 remain valid as stated and without qualification, in our judgment:

"There is much ferment and many contradictory forces at work in South African society. Continuing government repression coincides with some positive reforms and a great deal of debate among all racial groups. There is no clear pattern for the future."

"There are no easy solutions for South Africa. The choice is not between slow peaceful change and quick violent change but between a slow, uneven, sporadically violent evolutionary process and a slow but much more violent descent into civil war."

"Both paths could lead to genuine power sharing." [REDACTED]

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The South African Scene, Revisited

The following review of salient chapters of Time Running Out offers our views on the major themes and presents updated analysis where we believe that developments since 1981 have had an impact. This section does not attempt to chronicle all major events in South Africa since the book was published. [REDACTED]

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The People

The black population has continued to increase at a faster rate than other South African racial groups. (See tables below.) Updated population projections by the South African government indicate that by the year 2020, whites will represent only about 10 percent of the population compared to about 15 percent today. Although no new data are available on urbanization, information available through local press reporting--such as demand for housing--indicates that migration to urban areas by nonwhites is accelerating. [REDACTED]

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We agree with the study that ethnic links tend to diminish in importance in urban areas, and academic studies have pointed to the emergence of an urban proletariat. The proliferation of civic associations that cross tribal lines is evidence of this trend. However, this trend is still nascent and in our judgment should not be exaggerated. Ethnic-based violence--unrelated to antigovernment activity--is rampant. [REDACTED]

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The recent record underscores the conclusion of the authors that the government emphasizes tribal differences among blacks. Ethnic rivalries are a major constraint to black political unity. Direct government interference often aggravates these tribal frictions, such as the recent annexation of the Sotho-speakers of Moutse to Kwandebele.

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The drift toward a black versus white polarization noted in the study is gradual. In our view, nonwhites do not associate all whites with the system of apartheid. However, we believe antiwhite sentiment could accelerate suddenly given the growing militancy of township youth. Whites also may begin to see all blacks as their enemies if attacks on whites become common.

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South African Population in 1984

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>
Black	24,103,458	73.8
Indian	890,292	2.7
Colored	2,830,301	8.7
White	4,818,679	14.8
Total	32,642,730	100.0

Population Projections by Decade

<u>Year</u>	<u>2000</u>	<u>2010</u>	<u>2020</u>
Black	75.4	77.3	79.0
Indian	2.8	2.7	2.6
Colored	8.9	8.5	8.1
White	12.9	11.5	10.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

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The Apparatus of Apartheid

The basic features of apartheid--and the restrictions that the system places on nonwhite South Africans--still stand as described in the chapter despite a number of refinements that have been proposed and implemented since 1980. The ideological underpinnings of the apartheid structure have begun to show cracks, however. In our view, the government realizes that this ideal of "separateness" is no longer practical for the Afrikaner in economically interdependent South Africa. [REDACTED]

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The Homelands. The developments of the past few years have made the Botha government reassess the homeland concept, once a fundament of the National Party's apartheid scheme. The homeland system has drained the economy and led to unrest when the government forcibly removed the populations of whole towns and annexed territory to the homelands against the wishes of the residents. Furthermore, according to press and US Embassy reporting the homeland system has failed to stem the flow of blacks to urban areas or to silence the demands of urban blacks for political rights. Nevertheless, the government continues to implement its land consolidation plans, annexing areas--often against the will of the residents--to tribal areas. [REDACTED]

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The government has in effect recognized the permanence of the urban black population, while admitting the failure of the homeland concept as the area in which blacks would exercise political rights exclusively.

- Independence for homelands is now optional; Chief Gatsha Buthelezi's open refusal to accept independence for Kwazulu, the largest of the tribal areas, forced this adjustment.
- Parliament will consider this year government proposals to grant South African citizenship to South African blacks living outside the four independent homelands; the government also will consider granting dual citizenship to the residents of the independent states. South African citizenship for blacks still would not imply political rights in South Africa. [REDACTED]

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Political Representation. The system still excludes blacks from any significant political role, in our view and that of most observers. The concept of directly elected local black officials supervised by regional white "development boards" was envisaged as partial compensation to urban blacks for their exclusion from the new multiracial Parliament. Despite these intentions, the record shows that black councilors and mayors have been targetted by township militants, who viewed them as collaborators.

- During the period from September 1984 to June 1985, at least 240 black councilors resigned under pressure, and 29 of 32 black councils set up in 1983 are defunct. The homes of over 500 collaborators have been attacked over the past year.

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-- The 39-member Lekoa Town Council has 12 vacancies. Two special elections have been held to fill them; on 20 May, no one stood for election and on 21 October only one candidate stood for the 12 empty seats. []

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Black representation will be included in new provincial and local administrative structures planned for later this year. Blacks who participate in the new "regional services councils" probably also will be subject to attacks by militants. Furthermore, the US Embassy believes that the new arrangement will be seen by blacks as entrenching apartheid since white domination is assured. []

President Botha also has announced plans to include black representatives on the President's Council. Reports in the press indicate that if black participation occurs, the role of the Council will be reduced to a purely consultative body. As yet, however, no credible black has said he will serve. []

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Restrictions on Freedom of Movement. The Group Areas Act remains the basis for the residential separation of all races in South Africa. President Botha vigorously and openly rejected a motion to scrap the Act at a National Party provincial caucus in September 1985. However, other senior government officials subsequently made statements softening the official line on this issue. A government commission is studying the Act and is expected to make recommendations on revisions soon. The government, in our view, may eventually let local authorities decide if their residential areas should remain segregated. []

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Influx laws control the movement of blacks into urban areas. A landmark court decision in 1983--the Rikhoto judgment--made it possible for migrants who have worked in a prescribed area for 10 years for a single employer to apply for residency rights. A recent government study concluded that the Influx Laws need to be modified and Botha promised changes in his famous Rubicon speech in August. The Parliament probably will consider changes during 1986, but as with other reforms, implementation may take years. []

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Civil disobedience of residence and influx regulations is widespread. Government estimates put the number of illegal squatters in the Cape Town area at 100,000. A study by Rand Afrikaans University noted "grey areas" in the Johannesburg suburbs where 9,000 Coloreds, 6,500 Indians, and 4,500 blacks were living in a white area. []

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Petty Apartheid. The most obvious reforms have taken place in the area of petty apartheid, although barriers to nonwhites still are substantial. The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act was repealed in June 1985--Botha had first proposed the change in September 1979--making marriage between whites and nonwhites legal. (Residence for such couples is still problematic, however.) According to US Embassy and press reporting, strict separation of facilities and entertainment is eroding in major cities; many beaches and most parks have been integrated; theaters, hotels, and restaurants now have more flexibility. The white prerogative for "separate amenities" remains secure in smaller towns, however, and on trains and buses. []

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Civil Liberties

Assaults on civil liberties in South Africa have been well covered in the press during the last year and a half of unrest. The state of emergency, declared 21 July 1985 (26 October in the Cape Town area), has entailed infringements on freedoms of the press, speech, association, and assembly. The government has used emergency restrictions to ban the meetings of over 70 organizations and detain without trial over 7,000 persons. [REDACTED]

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The Workplace

The authors identify trends in the South African workplace that have incrementally improved wages and opportunities for black workers, who nevertheless still face tremendous obstacles relative to their white counterparts. This process has continued since 1980, according to South African statistics. The average ratio of white to black wages has fallen from 6.9 to 1 in 1970 to 4.0 to 1 in 1980 and 3.8 to 1 in 1983; on the other hand, the absolute wage gap has increased, widening from R2,790 per year average in 1970 to R10,400 per year in 1983 (1 rand = \$0.38). [REDACTED]

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Some progress has been made since the study was completed in removing barriers to nonwhite advancement. The government announced in July 1985 that nonwhites working in white areas as executives, managers, or technical or administrative employees are no longer subject to the legislative "color bars" that required them to be under the fulltime supervision and control of a white employer. Other nonlegislative color bars, however, were the product of negotiations between white labor unions and employer groups, and some still remain. Pretoria had publicly promised last year to intervene, if necessary, to eliminate the remaining color bars (the so-called "scheduled person" clauses) in the mining industry, including the provision that no black miners may hold "blasting certificates." Although Pretoria's deadline for the industry to remove voluntarily these color bars has passed, Pretoria has taken no action. [REDACTED]

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According to our estimates, the trend toward greater unionization and strikes by black workers has continued. Membership in emerging black unions has risen from 120,000 in 1979 to 680,000 at the end of 1985 (see Table below). Total black membership in all labor unions probably is about 900,000, or equivalent to about 15 percent of the economically-active black population. The number of man-days lost has risen from 148,000 in 1980 to 365,000 in 1984, a record that was exceeded in 1985. We agree with the authors' assessment that community support for strikes has grown. For example, several black consumer boycotts of companies involved in labor disputes were launched during 1984. [REDACTED]

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The study comments that the government decided in 1979 to give black unions official recognition and allow their participation in collective bargaining. By 1980, as the study notes, implementation of these changes had not produced significant practical results. We believe that recent developments have shown that the sweeping revision of

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South Africa's labor relations for black workers is potentially one of the most significant and far-reaching of the racial reforms introduced by the Botha government.

- In sharp contrast to many other government systems devised for blacks, the number of instances in which black unions have decided to work within the legal bargaining and appeal mechanisms has risen steadily since 1979; labor disputes heard by the "industrial court" rose from 168 in 1983 to 399 in 1984, while the number of applications for government-appointed labor conciliation boards increased from 118 in 1983 to 279 in 1984, according to government statistics.
- A landmark industrial court ruling late last year put limits on the right of companies to fire striking workers.
- Most black unionists--at least 500,000 in 1984--belong to newer unions comprising the so-called emerging black labor movement formed since 1979. Recently these unions have played a more political role (see table): for example, two large black labor unions and two black labor federations, representing a combined total of more than 350,000 black workers, helped to organize a highly successful two-day general strike in November 1984 in the Transvaal Province over a long list of political and economic demands; the formation last year of a new Congress of South African Trade Unions with about 500,000 members may boost significantly the political influence of black labor.
- The largest and potentially most powerful of these emerging black unions is the National Union of Mineworkers, which claims some 230,000 members; the NUM launched South Africa's first legal black miners' strike in September 1984, winning some concessions for its members; the existence of the union may gradually ease the often violent tribal conflicts that have plagued this vital industry.

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TABLE

Approximate Membership of Emerging Black Trade Unions

<u>Federation</u>	<u>Membership</u> <u>(1979)</u>	<u>Membership</u> <u>(1985)</u>
Federation of Southern African Trade Unions	45,000	--
Congress of South African Trade Unions	--	500,000
Council of Trade Unions of South Africa	30,000	100,000
Azanian Congress of Trade Unions	--	70,000
Unaffiliated Unions	<u>45,000</u>	<u>10,000</u>
Total	120,000	680,000

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Housing, Education, and Health

Housing, educational, and health services for blacks remain starkly inferior to those for whites. Based on black population and urbanization growth rates between now and the year 2000, 3 to 4 million housing units will have to be built just to keep the housing shortage at its present level, according to a number of studies.

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As part of the government's latest reform package, Parliament is expected to pass legislation this year allowing blacks to own their own houses in black townships. Although this represents a further government affirmation of the permanence of blacks in white areas, housing and credit shortages probably will limit severely the number of blacks who can take advantage of the new law. Blacks now are permitted to hold 99-year leases on houses in urban areas, but government statistics show that fewer than 1.5 percent of the total black population holds these leases.

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Expenditure for black education has risen each year during the 1980s, but still lags far behind whites on a per capita basis. Little progress has been made in upgrading the qualifications of teachers in black schools. A crisis in black and Colored education developed during 1985 when student boycotts spread rapidly after the state of emergency was declared in July, according to South African government estimates. More than half the Colored students in western Cape Province and over 75 percent of Soweto's blacks boycotted their high school diploma exams. The boycotts may continue into 1986--the tenth anniversary year of the Soweto riots.

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Education

	<u>State Spending Per Pupil (in rand)</u>	<u>Number of Students/Teacher</u>
Whites	1,654	18.9
Indians	1,088	23.0
Coloreds	569	26.0
Blacks	234	40.7

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The Economy

The authors hint at the importance of economic growth for the future stability of South Africa, and at the vulnerability of that growth to foreign pressures and world market conditions--two issues that we believe merit greater emphasis in light of recent events. According to government statistics, the economy has averaged less than 1 percent real growth per year over the past 5 years in the face of declining world prices for its exports, the worst drought in the country's history, and contractionary economic policies intended to fight inflation, currently running at nearly 17 percent. In particular, the world price of gold, which accounts for about one-half of export earnings, fell from a peak of over \$800 per ounce during 1980 to a low of less than \$300 per ounce last year. As the authors note, some 5.3 percent annual growth is needed over the long haul just to keep black unemployment from rising.

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As the study indicates--and as events have borne out--foreign debt and investment are potential sources of economic vulnerability for South Africa. As a result of the refusal by several foreign banks to renew credit lines, the country has declared a moratorium on the repayment of \$14 billion of its \$24 billion in overseas debt. This debt standstill already hurts South Africa's short-term prospects for a modest economic recovery, and could impair its ability to secure credit for the foreseeable future. The past 16 months of violent black protest, debt problems, and the threat of tougher Western economic sanctions have eroded investor confidence, reducing private direct investment that is vital to economic growth. According to government data, direct foreign investment in South Africa rose from \$16 billion in 1980 to \$17 billion in 1983, but we believe that it has fallen since. Unless capital inflows resume, we believe, South Africa is unlikely to average more than 3 percent real growth per year over the remainder of this decade.

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Pretoria clearly is concerned about its economic vulnerability to foreign pressures, and, in our judgment, often is willing to sacrifice short-term growth to reduce that vulnerability--as illustrated by its expensive drive towards greater energy

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self-sufficiency. We believe that the authors' assessment of the impact of an effective oil boycott remains generally correct. Nevertheless, the energy outlook has changed slightly since 1980 as a result of the third coal-to-oil conversion plant coming on line and the discovery of major offshore natural gas fields near Mossel Bay and Oranjemund, Namibia (the Kudu gas field). The Mossel Bay field is to be tapped for a gas-to-oil conversion plant that is expected to come on line by 1991. A fourth coal-to-oil conversion plant is planned for completion about the same time. The extent to which these new projects will reduce energy dependency ultimately will rest on how economic growth and energy demand proceed. [redacted]

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The Homelands

Despite some private investment, US Embassy and press reporting suggest the four independent and six non-independent homelands remain ecological and economic disasters. Government incentives and anti-union attitudes in the homelands have encouraged companies to locate there. Nevertheless, during 1984-85 official statistics show Pretoria supplied 77 percent of the income of homeland governments through direct grants called "development aid." Pretoria maintains a wide range of economic, defense, and technical agreements with the homelands that give it considerable control over homeland affairs. In return, some homeland governments have taken action against antiapartheid activists within their territory; the ANC is banned in all 10 homelands. [redacted]

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Black Challenge

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Of the six major trends in the black challenge to white authority identified in the chapter, we have reservations about only one: growing black unity. [redacted]

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We believe that a unity of purpose--to oppose the system of apartheid and those connected with it--has developed within the black townships, but other priorities often take precedence over that purpose, in our judgment. Events of 1985 support the authors' contention that the gap is narrowing between students and their parents, and between black workers and students; these groups often worked together to organize rallies and boycotts. However, the unrest also included a substantial amount of black on black violence, which seemed to us to have increased in proportion to the general level of violence. [redacted]

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The authors point to the ideological rift between black consciousness and nonracial advocates, and disputes over tactics and aims as a "crack in black unity." In our view, the violent disagreements between AZAPO and the UDF, or between the UDF and Inkatha, are more than arguments over ideology. They are symptomatic of the deep divisions that exist within black South Africa and have frequently led to bloodshed. In addition, ethnic conflict is a nationwide pattern. A review of press and US Embassy reporting shows that black-on-black violence also has occurred more frequently with youths enforcing boycotts on township residents or attacking those deemed to be

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colaborators. Counterattacks on youths by older vigilante groups also have been reported near Cape Town and Port Elizabeth. [REDACTED]

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The other trends noted by the authors seem to be tracking well, in our view.

- Acceptance of revolutionary violence. We believe, as the authors suggest, that there is a growing acceptance among blacks that fundamental change will come only through revolutionary violence. In a recent poll 69 percent of blacks (compared to 30 percent of whites) thought South Africa's problems would be resolved by civil war. Still, over half the blacks surveyed (and 84 percent of the whites) believed that violence was not justified as a means of changing the system.
- Growing interest in radical ideology. Radical rhetoric, if not ideology, is a prominent feature of the current cycle of unrest. Gangs of youths who control many townships call themselves "comrades." However, while the ideas and rhetoric of Marxism are touted widely, we view the flavor of the growing radicalism as essentially racially rather than class-based. The competition for adherents among various antiapartheid groups encourages increasingly militant rhetoric as a means of attracting support. Some of the affiliates of the United Democratic Front, for example, are moving toward black consciousness ideology--despite the Front's multiracial base. [REDACTED]
- Increasing Colored militancy. According to the government record, only about 16 percent of eligible Coloreds voted in the August 1984 elections for the Colored chamber in the new tricameral Parliament. Colored support for the United Democratic Front--founded to oppose the new constitution that excludes blacks--has been substantial. Escalating violence in the Colored townships of western Cape Province prompted Pretoria to extend the state of emergency to the Cape Town area in October. Colored student groups have openly vowed to extend their school boycott into 1986 despite the call by parents' committees to reopen the schools at the end of January.
- More political role of black workers. The new federation of black trade unions (COSATU), representing 500,000 workers, inaugurated in late 1985 will increase further the economic and political strength of black workers. The initial public rhetoric of the federation's leaders underscores the trend toward growing militancy during this period of unrest, even among moderate, politically unaffiliated black unions. Member unions of the United Democratic Front are likely to push for increased use of work stayaways, consumer boycotts, and other measures to gain concessions for blacks.
- Resurgence of the African National Congress. The ANC has become an important focal point for unifying blacks. Press reporting shows ANC

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flags and symbols are displayed prominently at funerals of unrest victims and at antiapartheid rallies. However, government countermeasures probably will prevent the ANC from transforming its popularity among South African blacks into large-scale active support in the townships. Furthermore, we believe that the ANC has for the most part been trying to play catch-up with the new black militancy during the past year and a half of violence in the townships. The group's dependence on external bases has become increasingly problematic given South Africa's aggressive regional policy and its determination to eliminate ANC insurgent operations from neighboring countries. We believe that the group will be able to maintain a campaign of sporadic but sometimes spectacular bombings in South Africa, but that political organization in the townships will be slow to develop. []

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White Rule

We agree with the conclusion of the authors that receptivity to new ideas among Afrikaners is increasing, and that traditional loyalties and political allegiances are developing a measure of fluidity. We are less certain about the conclusion that the majority of South African whites remain determined to resist any fundamental change in the political structure. We believe that shifting white values--perhaps driven in part by economic factors--may allow for some receptivity even to fundamental changes. For the same reason we believe the conclusion of the authors that the minimum demands of South African blacks go far beyond the likely maximum concessions by the verligte is overstated. We agree that Afrikaners who wish to see the immediate dismantling of apartheid and black majority rule remain a small and uninfluential minority of Afrikanerdom, but public statements by Afrikaner leaders suggest that a growing number of Afrikaners may be willing to negotiate a powersharing arrangement with blacks that guarantees rights for whites. []

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We believe Botha has demonstrated political skill in developing a broad coalition of whites who support his reform program. He has presented his program in such a manner that many progressive whites believe they must endorse it or accept the status quo, and many conservative whites believe they must support it or risk losing everything in time to a black revolution. []

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Botha must be mindful, however, of his right wing. The Conservative Party--formed in 1982 by 16 former National Party members who opposed Botha's plans for bringing nonwhites into the government--could lure more of the verkrampste from the National Party if reforms are pushed too fast. The potential for right-wing gains is greater now than in 1981, in our judgment. In addition to the reform question, the right wing also has been able to capitalize on white dissatisfaction over the government's handling of the economy. These issues were instrumental in the right's strong showing in the October 1985 byelections in which the Herstigte Nasionale Party won its first parliamentary seat ever. We believe that the right wing will remain a threat, but that the National Party will remain in power. []

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As noted in the chapter, English-speaking South Africans in general favor more rapid reforms. English-speaking businessmen have assumed a high-profile role in urging the government to move faster, particularly on those aspects of apartheid that inhibit South Africa's economy and industry. The restrictions on the flow of international credits--linked to unrest and the government's slow pace of reform--are another impetus to business involvement in pushing Botha to dismantle apartheid. [redacted]

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Fortress South Africa

We agree that in any realistic assessment of current South African military strength, white dominance appears beyond question. The government believes that it has the capacity to contain any level of black violence likely to occur. We believe that random attacks on whites would encourage Pretoria to take tougher action than it has over the past year and a half, despite the risks of increased international condemnation.

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SUBJECT: South Africa: Time Running Out, Revisited

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Original -- Ambassador William Kontos
 Executive Director,
 Advisory Committee on South Africa

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 International Security Affairs, DOD
- 1 -- William Struck, Defense Intelligence Officer,
 Defense Intelligence Agency
- 1 -- Jeffrey Davidow, Director, AF/S, Department of
 State
- 1 -- Director of Central Intelligence
- 1 -- Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
- 1 -- Executive Director
- 1 -- NIO for Africa
- 1 -- NIC
- 1 -- Chief, Africa Division, DDO
- 1 -- PDB Staff

[Redacted]

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- 1 -- Chief, DDI/PES
- 1 -- Director, ALA
- 1 -- Research Director, ALA
- 1 -- ALA/PS (one sourced copy; one clean copy)
- 5 -- OCPAS/IMD/CB
- 5 -- ALA/AF
- 2 -- ALA/AF/S
- 4 -- ALA/AF/S [Redacted]
- 2 -- ALA/AF/S [Redacted]

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ALA/AF/S [Redacted] (10 January 1985)

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[Redacted]

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